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Since the fall of the Berlin Wall Europe has been restructured to form a 
new and united entity. During this period the policymaking of the Euro-
pean Union was characterized by enlargement and deepening. However, 
enlargement has now passed its peak, and deepening, which was sup-
posed to have come about by reforming the EU treaties, has still not mate-
rialized. The EU needs some new guidelines. 
The old basic concepts of enlargement and 
deepening have had their day. They are of 
little or no use when it comes to meeting 
the challenges of a globalized world, which 
from April 2009 onwards will be symbol-
ized by the G 20 structure. This amounts 
to a new form of multilateralism which 
may not lead to unanimity, but at least to a 
candid exchange of views about how to 
deal with the problems of globalization. 
 
The old concepts were useful in the con-
text of an enlarged Europe that was sup-
posed to become a united continent of 
peace and freedom. In other words, they 
were very sensibly designed for domestic 
consumption. 
 
Today other problems are waiting to be 
solved. If the European Union wishes to 
respond to the global challenges, it badly 
needs sustainable basic concepts and a 
new story line. Timothy Garton Ash, the 
British political scientist, has pointed this 
out on several occasions recently. For ex-
ample, at the beginning of the German EU 
Presidency in 2007 he wrote an article in 
“The Guardian” entitled “Today’s European 
Union is 27 states in search of a story.” 
 
In fact what Garton Ash seems to think is 
lacking has actually been around for a 
long time, and this is the basic contention 
of the present Spotlight Europe. A new and 
successful story line has indeed emerged, 
though EU politicians and EU citizens of-
ten seem incapable of understanding what 
is happening before their very own eyes. 
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I 
Solidarity and Self-
Assertion 
The new basic concepts are solidarity and 
self-assertion. Thus the need for European 
self-assertion emanates from what has 
been said above. Yet why is it necessary to 
establish a close link between this word 
and the concept of solidarity? Because self-
assertion cannot come about on its own. If 
this is its goal, Europe will have to do 
something to attain it. It will have to keep 
regenerating its strength in everyday po-
litical life by demonstrating that its ac-
tions are based on the notion of solidarity. 
 
The core concern and the core idea of the 
EU is solidarity, and in a convoluted way it 
has been a constant feature ever since the 
birth of the European Economic Commu-
nity in 1957. This is how one should con-
strue the European Social Fund, which was 
set up at the time, not to mention the 
Common Agricultural Policy, which for a 
long time overshadowed everything else. 
Its stated task was to ensure that farmers 
received an adequate income. The commu-
nitarization of this policy area was simply 
founded on the idea of solidarity, and re-
quired all those involved to demonstrate it 
in practical terms. The euro is another ex-
ample of real and not merely emotional 
solidarity, since it imposes the same set of 
rules and regulations on all of the partici-
pants and at the same time makes it clear 
to each of them that they are responsible 
for making the venture a success. 
„The EU is preparing itself 
for a multi-polar age.” 
Such tools and institutions create solidar-
ity on a daily basis, and in the event of a 
crisis or a conflict can actually enforce it. 
Thus in this context the word does not 
signify a mere feeling of sympathy, but the 
insight dictated by self-interest that in the 
EU the supreme injunction is motto of the 
Three Musketeers: “One for all, and all for 
one.” Whoever transgresses against this 
rule weakens both himself and the whole 
community. Any attempt to emasculate the 
solidarity of the group is bound to under-
mine the prospects for personal or joint 
self-assertion. 
 
In this context there is a logical political 
sequence which determines the only sen-
sible and promising way in which Europe 
can act in the global arena. The Union 
needs to find suitable tools and establish 
institutions capable of creating and sus-
taining the degree of solidarity internally 
which will facilitate and stabilize its self-
assertion externally. 
 
Perhaps a comparison with other actors in 
the global arena may be useful at this 
juncture, as it were a mirror image of the 
European profile. In China, in Russia and 
even in the United States self-assertion is 
based on different patterns which are of-
ten of a national kind, and not infre-
quently nationalistic. Someone like Presi-
dent Medvedev is not going to ask the 
governors of the Russian federal subjects 
in the Far East or on the Volga to tell him 
what they think before he formulates his 
policy towards Washington. Someone like 
Barack Obama is not going to call Gover-
nor Schwarzenegger before he sets off for 
the NATO summit. And Chairman Hu Jin-
tao does not have to wait for feedback 
from the hierarchies in the provinces of 
Yunnan or Szechuan before he defines his 
foreign policy.  
 
This centralistic method of decision-
making is often taken to be a sign of 
strength, whereas Europeans who are de-
pendent on the outcome of a particular 
vote are often accused of weakness. Henry 
Kissinger once quipped “If I want to call 
Europe, who do I call?” There are good 
reasons why he no longer says things of 
this kind, though irate European citizens, 
politicians and commentators still like to 
quote him on the subject. However, the la-
borious and inelegant process of ongoing 
coordination among the 27 partners may 
well be the best preparation for the dis- 
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putes which will perhaps be conducted on 
the global stage in a multi-polar age. A 
new world order worthy of the name will 
be established with the help of rules which 
already form the basis of the EU: multilat-
eralism, pooled and yet divided sover-
eignty, common rules and norms, a politi-
cally delimited market, respect for others. 
Conversely it would also be true to say 
that if global disorder were to materialize, 
no actor would be as profoundly affected 
as the EU, since it will become apparent 
that its philosophy is actually incapable of 
dealing with the challenges of globaliza-
tion. 
 
II 
A Voice for the EU 
Today Europeans who wish to assert them-
selves can no longer afford never-ending 
disputes or a visible lack of solidarity, nor 
lengthy periods of inactivity designed to 
facilitate the alignment of common posi-
tions. In the global context a united 
Europe needs willing and determined ac-
tors in its various capitals and effective 
common procedures and institutions at the 
centre of the community in Brussels in or-
der to deal with these issues. 
 
Does the EU have sufficient tools and re-
sources with which to assert itself in a 
complex and globalized world made up of 
many co-players and civilizations? 
Whereas the majority of commentators 
will reply that the answer is definitely 
“No,” we believe that the opposite is true. 
At this point we are not going to insist on 
the need for a European Minister for For-
eign Affairs, who may not be allowed to 
use that title in the Treaty of Lisbon, but 
in practice, if the treaty is actually rati-
fied, will perform that function.  
 
No, we shall start by looking at the Doha 
Development Round. Pascal Lamy, the 
head of the WTO, has confirmed reports 
that, despite the current stalemate, agree-
ment has been reached on 80 per cent of 
all the contentious issues. The last meet-
ing came to nothing as a result of an In-
dian and American veto, but the outcome 
of the next set of negotiations could well 
be more positive now that there is a new 
administration in Washington. 
 
At these meetings the EU Commissioner 
for Trade negotiates on behalf of the Euro-
peans. In Paris and elsewhere there has 
been some criticism of his actions. But the 
procedure has remained in place, and the 
EU speaks with one voice. Washington, 
Delhi and Cairo know exactly which num-
ber they have to call. 
 
If the EU can manage to display such una-
nimity when it comes to trade issues, why 
does it find it impossible to do so else-
where? For example, Horst Köhler, the 
former president of the International 
Monetary Fund and current German Presi-
dent, in a speech  he gave in Berlin in 
March 2009, called on the Europeans “to 
bundle their interests in the IMF and 
World Bank by opting for a single seat.” 
And if the Europeans were to bundle their 
resources by opting for a single seat and 
one voice in this context, then why not do 
the same in the United Nations, when it 
comes down to it? Some people will point 
out that this is not on the agenda and 
would not be in the interests of the Euro-
pean nuclear powers, France and the 
United Kingdom. This may well be the 
case, but only if we continue to look at the 
world in terms of the concepts and dimen-
sions which applied in 1945.  
 
Why, more than six decades after its foun-
dation in the shadow of late colonialism 
and the nascent Cold War, should the 
United Nations still adhere to agreements 
that stem from a distant and now unfamil-
iar past, rules which at the time were 
adopted by 51 nations and are now ob-
served by 192? The ethical dimension of 
the approaching global society will have to 
be part and parcel of the new rules. Fur-
thermore, the Europeans would profit in-
ternally (solidarity!) and externally (self-
assertion) if they themselves were to in-
troduce and promote the transition to this 
new code of conduct.   
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III 
European Power Politics 
The kind of solidarity that translates ex-
ternally into self-assertion stands on re-
markably solid foundations, even though 
many people in Europe are still not aware 
of the fact. Case study number one. The 
European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, 
as a result of a case 
brought by the EU 
Commission, slapped fines 
amounting to almost €0.5 
billion on Microsoft, the 
U.S. software corporation, 
on account of its anti-
competitive behaviour in 
Europe. Whilst Microsoft is 
still disputing the size of 
the fines, it explicitly 
recognizes the European 
jurisdiction. In the largest 
internal market in the 
world it simply does not 
wish to exacerbate the 
situation. 
 
In 2001 the European 
Commission refused to give 
its assent to the merger of 
General Electric and 
Honeywell Bull, which had 
already received regulatory 
approval in the U.S., citing 
the danger of market domi-
nance and an unwelcome 
concentration of power. In 
other words, a European 
institution decided to 
prevent two American cor-
porations from 
implementing a strategic 
decision, and got its way. Is the EU really 
as powerless as some people think it is? 
 
Let us look at another example. The Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy is available to 
all the partners of the EU who agree to 
adopt a set of policymaking rules drawn 
up in Brussels. The aim is to establish a 
“ring of friends and stable states,” which 
is of course far more acceptable as far as 
Europe’s security and self-assertion are 
concerned than a string of crises and con-
flicts. Countries ranging from Morocco to 
Egypt and from Israel to Azerbaijan are of-
fered preferential treatment in the shape 
of market access or modernization assis-
tance, and in return the contractual part-
ners are required to introduce reforms re-
lating to human rights and the rule of law. 
 
This is power politics, even though the 
Europeans would immediately add that 
they are going about it in a peaceful and 
reasonable manner, and in the fairest pos-
sible way. Even if they have no intention 
of ever joining the EU, ENP partners end 
up by adopting quite a few of the norms 
and procedures which were developed  
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within the EU in the course of its history, 
have been tried and tested, and have   
become part of the everyday fabric of soli-
darity. 
For this reason the French political scien-
tist Zaki Laidi has appropriately described 
the EU as “a normative empire,” which has 
taken to protecting global public goods 
such as the environment, resources, and 
children (for example, by enforcing the 
ban on child labour). Of course in this way 
the EU is most influential, or, to put it 
more bluntly, most powerful in its imme-
diate neighbourhood. With its policies on 
trade and foreign trade issues it has been 
setting global standards for quite a long 
time, as the Oxford political scientist Jan 
Zielonka has pointed out. The internatio-
nal climate change debate as exemplified 
by the Kyoto process has to an important 
extent been shaped by European standards 
and goals. Zielonka calls this “empire by  
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example.” The EU in so many words is an 
“empire which sets a good example.” 
 
There is justified criticism within the EU 
of the fact that there is a great deal of 
rhetoric, but that very little actually gets 
done. However, there can be no doubt 
about the EU’s declared intention that it 
wishes to shape the world of tomorrow in 
certain specific ways. Garton Ash is also 
beginning to speak of a “silent empire,” 
even if he still cannot decipher its story 
line. Significantly the agreements reached 
at the G 20 summit in London on how to 
facilitate the restructuring of the interna-
tional banking, financial and indeed eco-
nomic world were to a large extent based 
on (Continental) European proposals and 
demands. 
 
IV 
A Global Social Market 
Economy 
The European Union is an empire. On the 
whole it is a purely civilian one, but when 
it  decides to act on a military level in 
countries ranging from Haiti and the DR 
Congo to Kosovo, the goal is not  belliger-
ent confrontation, triumphalism or territo-
rial acquisitions, but quite explicitly the 
pacification of smouldering or open con-
flicts. The EU is an empire without colo-
nies, and a military power with peaceful 
intentions and civil policies. 
 
The word may come as a surprise or even 
shock to some Europeans, for after all   
European rulers and nations projected 
their imperial power throughout the world 
for centuries. Today no one is compelled to 
align his or her policies or economy with 
the new Europe. But a growing number of 
countries in all parts of the world have 
recognized the advantages of the European 
way of defining norms, and have indeed 
u s e d  i t  a s  a  m o d e l .  T h e  G u l f  s t a t e s  a r e  
working on a common currency similar to 
the euro. In Latin America Mercosur has 
for a long time–though unfortunately with 
little success–been trying to establish an 
internal market based on the European 
experience.  
 
And the members of Asean are beginning 
to understand that historical hatred can be 
overcome more easily by engaging in for-
ward-looking cooperation. People have ac-
tually been imitating Europe for quite a 
while. 
„Good chances for a 
global social market  
economy.” 
For how long can the model character of 
the EU continue to be influential in the 
immediate future? In the Treaty of Lisbon 
the 27 EU partners reached agreement on 
the basic principles of the social market 
economy. As a result of the global crisis, 
which is sucking into its vortex not only 
the economy, but also values as such, their 
time now seems to have come. The propo-
nents of an “unadulterated” market econ-
omy based on the unregulated exploitation 
of resources, and even of human beings, 
are now on the defensive. To be sure, there 
have always been disputes within the EU 
about the exact extent and meaning of the 
social market economy, in particular after 
enlargement in 2004. This will continue to 
be the case. As co-authors of this economic 
and social order the Germans should show 
some restraint, for in the past decade the 
Scandinavians, for example, have demon-
strated that a social market economy 
needs to be renewed if it wishes to retain 
its reputation and its effectiveness. 
 
Yet at the same time the chances for a 
global social market economy have never 
been better. However, Europeans should 
try to avoid carrying the good tidings out 
into the world in the manner of missionar-
ies. We know all about that, people will re-
tort in an irritable way and close their 
minds to the subject. Moscow is already 
making a point of demonstratively reject-
ing so-called Western and European val-
ues. And China continues to cling to its 
own traditions.  
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The Europeans need to be patient, and 
should continue to try to make their case. 
In the long run India, Russia and China 
will need a social market economy if they 
wish to protect whole societies from being 
wrecked by a successful few. When they 
proceed to implement social reforms, these 
rising and ambitious nations will not take 
their bearings only from the European 
model, but they will all try to learn from it. 
This brings us to the most momentous and 
underestimated challenge of globalization 
as far as Europe is concerned, the rise of 
the rest of the world, which the American 
author Fareed Zakaria has simply dubbed 
“The Rise of the Rest.” In future neither 
Europe nor the Transatlantic tandem will 
determine what happens in the world 
without reference to anyone else. 
 
V 
The New World Order 
The Eurocentric world is now at long last a 
thing of the past, and so is the Transatlan-
tic predominance of the West. The circle of 
actors has grown rapidly and continues to 
expand. Japan has been a member for a 
long time, as has South Korea, which was 
followed by the BRIC states, Brazil, Russia, 
India and China. But it also includes Indo-
nesia, Mexico, South Africa, and the Gulf 
states. At the beginning of April, when the 
G20 states met in London for their crisis 
summit, the formal arrangement in itself 
signified a departure from the world of the 
past, and perhaps provided a formula for 
the world as it is today. 
 
“The Rise of the Rest” will not only lead to 
new kinds of interaction and new hierar-
chies on a geographical or political level. 
In so many words it means that the Euro-
peans will have to adopt a new mindset. In 
his Berlin speech German President Horst 
Köhler made the point that up here in the 
north we will have to change our attitudes. 
He was alluding not only to the issue of 
justice and the unequal distribution of the 
available resources. Köhler referred to the 
“global social issue” and the question of 
the ethical stance of the world community. 
What he had to say could in fact become 
the basic legal framework of Europe’s 
global policy as it interacts with the new-
comers, some of whom can look back on a 
history reaching back several thousand 
years. “In future,” Köhler remarked, “we 
want to treat others in the same way that 
we ourselves wish to be treated.” En-
shrined in the hearts of its citizens, this 
vision statement formed the core of the 
European success story.  
 
Mutual respect helped the original EEC 
community of six to become today’s Union 
of 27 and more members. Respect led to 
common rules and growing strength. The 
EU has long since become an important 
global player in political terms. It is the 
largest trading bloc and the largest donor 
of development assistance. For the time 
being the euro is the world’s second re-
serve currency. And on four continents the 
EU is helping to resolve crises and con-
flicts. 
 
Admittedly the set of political tools the EU 
needs for its new global role is still in the 
process of being forged. Europe’s self-
image and strategic thinking have not 
caught up with recent developments. In 
contrast to the United States, China, India 
or Russia, its world does not begin some-
where quite a long way away, but on its 
own doorstep. Thus in its dealings with 
neighbours from Morocco to Azerbaijan 
Europe must assert  itself and demonstrate 
that in the 21
st century the form and sub-
stance of its global policymaking have fi-
nally broken with the European policy of 
expansion which was prevalent in earlier 
centuries.  
 
After decades of much-needed and suc-
cessful restructuring Europe must in fu-
ture set its sights on the world as a whole. 
A fitting story line has been found. It is 
driven by the notion of solidarity and self-
assertion, and this makes it possible to 
look in an unprejudiced way at a world 
which may well end up by being improved 
and restructured partly on the basis of 
European experiences.  
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